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The Coming Collision: Romer and State Defense of 
Marriage Acts 
Patrick J. Borchers* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Andrew Koppelman's book, Same Sex, Different States: When 
Same-Sex Marriages Cross State Lines, 1 drove me to the realization 
that interstate choice of law questions involving same-sex marriage 
arc entering a new and more subtle stage of debate. 2 The easier 
questions, such as whether one state can effectively dictate marriage 
policy to the rest of the United States, are gradually sorting 
themselves out. But as same-sex marriages-or their conceptual twin, 
same-sex civil unions-become a reality in a handful of states, the 
harder and more subtle questions of extending some incidents of 
marriage arc increasingly likely to appear. 
This Article addresses some of these questions and demonstrates 
that the debate regarding same-sex marriage may turn on whether 
the government will be compelled to extend equal protection rights 
to homosexuals on the basis that state defense of marriage acts 
potentially "impos[ e] a broad and undifferentiated disability on a 
single named group. " 3 While Part II of this Article provides necessary 
background regarding the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the 
United States Constitution, Part III demonstrates the effects of 
federal and state defense of marriage acts. Part III also sets forth a 
guiding hypothetical relevant to the constitutionality of state defense 
of marriage acts. Part IV discusses the significant impact of recent 
Supreme Court precedent on defense of marriage laws. Finally, Part 
V posits that Supreme Court jurisprudence makes a conflict with 
state defense of marriage acts inevitable. Part V also demonstrates 
that the Supreme Court's gradual expansion of substantive 
* Vice President ti>r Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, Creighton University. 
!. ANDREW KOPPELMA~, SAME SEX, DIFFERE~T STATES: WHEN SAME·SEX 
MARRIA< dc:S CROSS STATE LINES ( 2006). 
2. See Hcnerallv Patrick J. Borchers, Middle Ground?, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 265 
( 2007) (book review). 
3. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 ( 1996 ). 
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constitutional rights to homosexuals is likely to continue if the Court 
can find a principled basis for not extending those rights to other 
sexual minorities. 
II. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
PREDICTIONS 
To begin, this Article addresses one of the easy questions: 
whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause would f(xce states to 
recognize same-sex marriage. When same-sex marriage first emerged 
in the United States,4 the press and even some legal experts predicted 
that the Full Faith and Credit Clause would force every other state to 
treat same-sex couples as married as long as the couple married in a 
haven state. s This was a thoroughly uninformed prediction fueled by 
a complete confusion of the "choice of law" and "judgment 
recognition" strands of full faith and credit jurisprudence. 6 Of 
course, just because it was uninformed did not mean that it was not 
widely repeated. 7 
For the Full Faith and Credit Clause to have this dtect, one must 
assume that the clause operates like a magician's card trick in which 
one card is flipped over and the rest of the deck goes with it. Behind 
this false "card trick" assumption lies the truth that the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause and its implementing statute require a state to 
recognize, mostly without question, another state's litigated 
4. The apparent likelihood was the result of the Hawaii Supreme Court's decision in 
Baehr P. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), which appeared likely to create a state 
constitutional right to enter into a same-sex union. The Hawaii decision, however, was 
efiectively reversed by a voter-approved amendment to the state constitution. A similar 
initiative also passed in Alaska in response to similar litigation. See Carey Goldberg, Redefining 
a Marriage Made New in Vermont, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1999, at§ 4, p. wk3. 
5. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Essential Irrelevance of the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
to the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 38 CREIGHTON L. REv. 353, 353 (2005) (noting frequent 
assertions to this effect in the popular press). 
6. See Patrick J. Borchers, Baker v. General Motors: Implications j11r Interjurisdictional 
Recognition of Non-Traditional Marriages, 32 CREIGHTON L. REv. 147, 164-67 (1998) 
(discussing student law review articles and professional articles advancing this view); see also 
Linda J. Silberman, Cart the Island of Hawaii Bind the World? A Comment rm Same-Sex 
Marriage and Federalism Values, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 191, 193 (1996); Gary J. Simson, 
Beyond Interstate Recognition in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 313, 
325 (2007) ("[T]hcre is not the slightest doubt that under the Supreme Court's interpretation 
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, a state has no obligation to look to another state's law to 
decide the validity of an out-of~state marriage contracted by its residents."). 
7. KoPPELMA:>:, mpra note I, at 117 (statement was "fecklessly" repeated in the 
popular press). 
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judgments, even if the judgment is demonstrably incorrect on a legal 
or f~1ctual issue.x Courts treat divorces as litigated judgments; thus, 
assuming the rendering court has jurisdiction, a divorce must be 
recognized even if granted for reasons that the recognizing state 
would not allow.9 By analogizing to divorces, proponents of same-
sex marriage argued that a state forbidding same-sex unions would 
not be able to refuse recognition to such a union as long as it was 
lawfully created in another state. 10 
Although there are multiple and obvious problems with this line 
of reasoning, this Article contlnes itself to just two of these problems. 
First, a marriage is not a litigated judgment. A marriage is unlike a 
divorce, or any other litigated judgment, in that there is no such 
thing as a "contested" marriage. Both parties have to agree in order 
to get married. Suppose that Pat wants to marry Jordan, but Jordan 
is not keen on the idea. Would the couple then head to the 
courthouse and appear in front of a judge who will decide whether 
they arc to be married? Obviously not. As long as Jordan remains 
unwilling to marry, there will be no marriage. In divorces, on the 
other hand, a court may grant a divorce even if one party wants to 
get divorced and the other does not. In fact, even if both parties 
want to end the marital relationship, the court usually must make 
critical t:Ktual and legal findings of continuing significance to the 
parties. 
Second, even if the notion of a judgment is stretched to 
encompass a marriage, the question remains as to who could be 
bound by it. It is a bedrock principle of judgments law, with just a 
couple of exceptions that are not even remotely applicable here, that 
a stranger to the proceedings cannot be bound adversely.ll Thus, to 
allow a same-sex couple joined in one state to bind third parties 
8. See, eg., rauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230,237 (1908) (Mississippi state courts are 
bound to accept mistaken interpretation of their state law by another state's courts). There are 
some modest exceptions to this general rule. See generally Thomas v. Washington Gas Light 
Co., 448 U.S. 261 ( 1980) (successive workers' compensation awards do not necessarily violate 
full faith and credit); fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. l (1909) (full faith and credit need to be applied 
to decrees from a state court purporting to convey land in another state); William Reynolds, 
'Ihe Iron Law ofFull Faith and Credit, 53 MD. L. REV. 412 (1994). However, as the Supreme 
Court has explained, there is "no roving public policy exception" to the general requirement 
that states enforce each others' judgments. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 
( 1998) (internal quotations omitted). 
9. Su, eg., Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 293-94 ( 1942). 
10. Borchers, .rupra note 5, at 354. 
II. See, eg., Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 759, 761 ( 1989). 
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(e.g., other state governments or individuals with whom they have 
dealings) to treat the couple as married would be to give the 
marriage an effect beyond even that of a fully litigated judgment. 
III. THE EFFECTS OF THE FEDERAL AND STATE DEFENSE OF 
MARRIAGE AcTS 
In addition to the persuasive arguments against applying full 
faith and credit to marriage, the federal Defense of Marriage Act 
("DOMA") 12 amends the statute that implements the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause. DOMA makes clear that states need not (but may) 
give effect to same-sex unions from other states. Thus f:1r, courts 
appear to be in agreement that states that do not recognize same-sex 
unions are not required to honor those unions consummated in 
states that do allow same-sex marriage or civil unions. 13 So the 
nightmare or dream (depending on which side one is on) of same-
sex couples flying off to California, Connecticut, or Massachusetts 14 
and returning home with an unassailable marital relationship remains 
just that: a nightmare or a dream. 
Nevertheless, the corollary of DOMA is not necessarily that 
states are free to ignore all aspects of a same-sex marriage all of the 
time. A marriage affects the legal relationships of a couple in many 
12. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified in part at 2il U.S.C. § 173XC 
(1996)). 
13. See, eg., Smelt v. County of Orange, 374 f. Supp. 2d X61, X64 (C.D. C1l. 2005) 
(federal DOMA constitutional); Wilson v. Ake, 354 f. Supp. 2d 1298, 1303 (M.D. Fla. 2005) 
(Massachusetts same-sex marriage not entitled to full faith and credit); Burns \'. Burns, 560 
S.E.2d 47, 49 (Ga. Cr. App. 2002) (Vermont civil union between same-sex partners not a 
marriage for purposes of a Georgia child visitation order); Langan v. St. Vincent's Hosp. of 
N.Y., 802 N.Y.S.2d 476,479-80 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (Vermont civil union docs not give 
same-sex partner right to recover for wrongtid death under New York law), appeal dismissed, 
850 N.E.2d 672 (N.Y. 2006); cf Lofton v. Kearney, !57 f. Supp. 2d 1372 (S.D. Ha. 2001 I 
(treating adoption orders as judgments). 
14. Massachusetts has, by decree of the Supreme Judicial Court, extended its marri<lgc 
laws to include same-sex couples, but in Cote· Whitacre 1'. Department of l'ttblic Hctllth, the 
Supreme Court of Massachusetts upheld the Massachusetts marriage evasion stcltutc in 
application to our-ofstatc same-sex couples domiciled in states that prohibit Sclmc-sex 
marriage. 844 N.E.2d 623, 643 (Mass. 2006). Massachusetts, however, repealed that statute, 
thus allowing out-ofstatc same-sex couples to be married. MASS. (.;EN. LAWS AN;-.;. ch. 207, § 
10 (1994) (repealed 2008). Califixnia's Supreme Court recently ruled that marri<lgc is a 
constitutional right, regardless of sexual orientation. In reMarriage Cases, 183 !'.3d 384, 4S3 
(Cal. 2008). Even more recently, the Connecticut Supreme Court t()und such a right in its 
state constitution. See Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, No. SC 17716, 200X \VL 
4530885, at *42-47 (Conn. 2008). 
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ways. Industrious studies reveal that marriage affords more than a 
thousand legal benefits to a marital couplc. 15 Some of these are rights 
and duties unique to marriage, but others could be replicated by 
non-marital couples. 16 Obvious examples can be found in estate law. 
for instance, states generally prohibit the complete disinheritance of 
a spouse either by giving rights in community property or creating a 
forced share of the estate. 17 Those rights and duties are unique to 
marriage. States also give a spouse some or all of the estate in the 
event that the other spouse dies intestate. 18 An unmarried couple 
could, however, easily replicate intestate distribution by drafting wills 
consistent with the intestacy distribution scheme. 
The t()llowing two hypothetical cases demonstrate benefits that 
are unique to marriage and that cannot be replicated by non-marital 
couples. First, suppose that Pat and Jordan are of the same sex, living 
in Massachusetts, and they decide to get married. Later they relocate 
to Nebraska where they live until Jordan dies. Jordan's estate consists 
of personal and real property located in Nebraska. Jordan's will 
completely disinherits Pat. Pat then goes to a Nebraska state court to 
contest the will and invoke the right of a spouse to elect a forced 
share against the will under Nebraska law. 19 
Second, suppose all the same facts except that Jordan dies 
without a will. Pat goes to a Nebraska state court to claim the 
intestate spousal share.20 
Except f()r the tact that Pat and Jordan are of the same sex, Pat 
would surely win both cases. However, Nebraska, like about forty 
other states, has a state defense of marriage act. In Nebraska, voters 
passed such an act through voter initiative, and the Eighth Circuit 
has upheld the law's constitutionality against facial attack. 21 
15. Sec GEt-;ERAL ACCOL1 ~'J'ING OFFICE, CATEGORIES OF LAWS I:-.JVOLVING Mi\IUTAL 
STATl'S 2 ( 1997 ), aPailablc at http:/ /www,gao,govjarchive/ 1997 /og970 ]6,pdf (finding 
I 049 tCdcr.lllaws in which marital status is a tactor), 
16, See KOPPELMAN, supra note I, at 102-13, 
17, Sa J\hrv Ann Glendon, Matrimonial Propaty: A Compamtive Study of LaJP and 
Social CIHllllfC, 49 TUI,, L REV, 21, 59-60 ( 1974), 
UL Sec, c,q,, Horey v, Florey, 325 N,W,2d 643 (Ncb, 1982), 
19, NEB, REV, STAT § 30-2313 (2007) (right to take one-half of the augmented 
estate); c( lit rc Cooper, 592 NYS,2d 797, 799 (NY App, Div, 1993) (dictum) (same-sex 
partner not entitled to t:,rccd share Linder New York law), 
20, :\EB, RFV STAT,§ 30-2302 (2007) (entire estate in the absence of surviving issue); 
c( Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 33 P_3d 735, 736 (Wash_ 2001) (claim by same-sex partner to de 
bcto intest.1tc sh.1rc ccmnot be resolved on summary judgment), 
21, Sec Citizens f(>r Equal Prot_\', Bruning, 455 F3d 859, 868 (8th Cir_ 2006 ), 
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Nebraska's so-called Initiative 416 reads as follows: "Only marriage 
between a man and a woman shall be valid or recognized in 
Nebraska. The uniting of two persons of the same sex in a civil 
union, domestic partnership, or other similar same-sex relationship 
shall not be valid or recognized in Nebraska. " 22 
Any fair reading of this provision would demand that Pat lose 
both hypothetical cases. The provision clearly requires courts 
applying Nebraska's law3 to treat same-sex couples united in any 
legal way (whether it be marriage, civil union, or similar device) as if 
they were unmarried. If Pat were merely the unmarried co-habitant 
of Jordan, Pat would have no claim either to the forced share in the 
tl.rst hypothetical or to the intestate share in the second hypothetical 
case. 
To prevail on either theory, Pat would have to show that 
Nebraska's defense of marriage act is unconstitutional in application. 
Pat's best argument would be that Nebraska's Initiative 416, as 
applied, violates Pat's equal protection rights. What are Pat's equal 
protection rights? Answering this question requires one to grasp the 
reasoning of one of the most slippery of cases in the recent history of 
the United States Supreme Court, Romer v. Evans. 24 
IV. THE IMPACT OF ROMER AND LAWRENCE ON STATE DEFENSE 
OF MARRIAGE ACTS 
The Supreme Court's decision in Romer v. EvanJ25 may have a 
substantial impact on whether state defense of marriage acts, like 
Initiative 416 in Nebraska, violate the equal protection rights of 
homosexual Americans. The Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texal6 
further suggests that state defense of marriage laws, which 
disadvantage discrete groups such as homosexuals, may be irrational 
and unconstitutional. 
In Romer, the Court considered an equal protection challenge to 
a Colorado voter-adopted measure known as An1endment 2. That 
amendment read as follows: 
22. NEB. C:ONST. art. I,§ 29 (2000). 
23. Nebraska law is the only law that conceivably could be applied given tlut the 
decedent died domiciled in Nebraska, and all the personal and real property w.1s located there. 
See ELTGENE F SCOLES ET AL., CONI'I.ICT OF LAW' 1109~17 (4th ed. 2004 ). 
24. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
25. ld. 
26. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or 
departments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, 
municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any 
statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, 
lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships 
shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or 
class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota 
preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This 
Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing.27 
Amendment 2 was challenged immediately and successfully. The 
Colorado Supreme Court struck it down applying the "strict 
scrutiny" test of constitutional review, finding that the measure 
impinged on the fundamental right of equal protection and that the 
measure could not survive the exacting requirement of advancing a 
compelling state interest by the least restrictive means. 28 
A six-vote majority of the U.S. Supreme Court led by Justice 
Kennedy disagreed with the Colorado Supreme Court's rationale but 
affirmed the judgment striking down Amendment 2. 29 Rather than 
the demanding strict scrutiny test applied by the state courts, the 
majority purported to apply the much more deferential test under 
which the state law need only bear "a rational relation to some 
legitimate end. " 30 Explaining how the majority reached the 
conclusion that Amendment 2 failed this test is challenging, to say 
the least. 
In the past, the Court's invocation of the rational basis test has 
been little more than a shorthand way of saying that the Court was 
about to uphold the constitutionality of the state law. In many cases, 
the Court has refused to tlnd that the state law in question was 
completely irrational or unconnected to a legitimate state end. 31 
Suppose, to take a light-hearted variant of Amendment 2, Colorado 
had adopted a measure forbidding special protection of left-banders. 
It seems likely that the Supreme Court would have said that, no 
27. !d. at 624 (quoting COLO. CONST. art. II,§ 30(b)). 
28. Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1357 (Colo. 1994), aff'd on different grounds, 517 
U.S. 620 (1996). 
29. Romer, 517 U.S. at 626. 
30. Id. at 631. 
31. See, e.._q., ~CC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993) (rational basis 
review is a "paradigm of judicial restraint"). 
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matter hmv odd the law might be, it constitutes a rational eff()rt to 
keep righties and lefties on the same footing. 
The Romer majority, however, took a diftcrent approach. The 
majority concluded that "Amendment 2 fails, indeed defies" the 
rational relation test. 32 Its lack of a rational basis, 33 the Court 
reasoned, stemmed from its "peculiar property of imposing a broad 
and undifferentiated disability on a single named group. " 34 In one of 
its most instructive passages, the majority held: 
[T]he amendment imposes a special disability upon those persons 
alone. Homosexuals are forbidden the safeguards that others enjoy 
or may seek without constraint. They can obtain specific protection 
against discrimination only by enlisting the citizenry of Colorado to 
amend the State Constitution or perhaps, on the State's view, by 
trying to pass laws of general applicability. This is so no matter how 
local or discrete the harm, no matter how public and widespread 
the injury. We find nothing special in the protections Amendment 
2 withholds. 35 
Despite this author's great personal affection for the Romer 
majority's author,36 the opinion is reminiscent of M.C. Escher's 
drawing Ascending and Descending. Escher's drawing depicts monks 
walking along a closed staircase in which every step appears to lead 
upwards as one travels in a clockwise direction. 37 Despite most 
appearances to the contrary, however, the monks neither ascend nor 
descend as they move along the staircase.38 As in the Escher drawing, 
each individual piece of Romer looks fine, yet the overall picture 
defies explanation. 
Justice Scalia's dissent thoroughly skewers the logic of the 
majority opinion. As he correctly points out, there are many rational 
reasons why voters might want to keep a group--whether they be 
redheads, lefties, or gays--from obtaining special protected status in 
32. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632. 
33. The Court appears to use the terms "rational relationship" and "rational b.1sis" 
interchangeably to describe this test. See, e.g., Heller v. Doc, 509 U.S. :\12, 320 (1993); 
Webster v. Rep rod. Health Scrvs., 492 U.S. 490, 543 ( 1989) ( Blackmun, J , dissenting). 
34. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632. 
35. Id. at 631. 
36. 1 was a clerk t(x Justice Kennedy when he was a judge of the United States Court of 
Appeals. 
37. An image of the drawing can be found at: http:/ /www.worldokscher.com/galkn/ 
AscendingDcscendingLg.html. 
38. Id. 
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the law. 39 One of those reasons might, of course, be irrational hatred 
of the group, but there are certainly competing rational 
explanations.40 
But logical or not, the Romer majority opinion commanded six 
of the Court's nine votes. 41 Now the question is what implications 
Romer will have on the future development of the law in relation to 
state defense of marriage acts. Although an infinite number of 
intermediate positions are possible, the possibilities lie between two 
poles. At one pole is the possibility that Romer is sui generis and 
driven entirely by the desire not to subject a minority to the will of 
the majority in a question of access to the political process. On that 
view, Romer would have few implications for state defense of 
marriage acts and would be limited to broad enactments like 
Colorado's Amendment 2. At the other pole is the possibility that 
Romer, despite its apparent reliance on the rational basis test, actually 
promotes homosexuals to the status of a suspect class (like racial 
classest2 or at least a quasi-suspect class (like women).43 On that 
view, Romer might be much like the early cases in which the 
Supreme Court purported to apply the rational basis test to strike 
down gender-based classifications44 before then explicitly promoting 
those classifications to quasi-suspect status. 45 At this extreme, Romer 
would have broad implications for state defense of marriage acts. In 
t:Kt, so understood, Romer may moot the entire question of 
interstate recognition by creating a federal constitutional right to 
same-sex marriage.46 
39. Romrr, 517 U.S. at 644-45 (Scalia,)., dissenting). 
40. !d. 
41. Romer, 517 U.S. at 623,636. 
42. See, e,q., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 
273H, 2764 (2007) (reiterating that raci,1l classifications must be reviewed under strict 
scrutiny). 
43. See, t'JJ., Nguyen v. l.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 60-61 (2001) (applying equal protection 
scrutinY to gender-based classification). 
44. Sec, e,q., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71,76-77 (1971) (striking down, on rational-basis 
grounds, a state statute preferring men to women as administrators of estates). 
45. Sa, L"F, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S .• I90, 197 (1976) (holding that gender-based 
classifications "must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related 
to achievement of those objectives"). 
46. Sec Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 55H, 590, 600-01 (2003) (Scalia, )., dissenting) 
I noting that classification is necessary to limit marriage to opposite-sex couples; "[ t ]his 
reasoning leaves on pretty shaky grounds state laws limiting marriage to opposite-sex 
couples"). 
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As is often the case, the truth likely lies somewhere between 
these two extremes. Perhaps the Court has no inclination to promote 
homosexuality to suspect or "quasi-suspect" status. Instead, the 
Court may be signaling that it skeptically views neutral explanations 
of state enactments that disadvantage homosexuals. Some support 
for an intermediate reading comes from the Court's decision in 
Lawrence v. Texas. 47 In Lawrence, the Supreme Court struck dovvn a 
Texas statute criminalizing same-sex sodomy on substantive due 
process grounds.48 In so doing, the Court expressly overruled its 
1986 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick49 that refused to strike down 
Georgia's anti-sodomy law.50 
Lawrence and Bowers involved arguably distinguishable statutes. 
The Texas statute challenged in Lawrence was limited to homosexual 
conduct, while the Georgia statute at issue in Bowers was not so 
limited, though it was challenged by a gay man who had been 
arrested under the statute. 51 The Texas limitation to same-sex 
conduct opened the door to a possible R.omer-based equal 
protection challenge, and the majority described such a challenge as 
"tenable."52 Moreover, Justice O'Connor-who concurred only in 
the judgment in Lawrence--would have struck down the Texas 
statute on equal protection grounds, relying heavily on Romer to 
reach that conclusion.53 
It is noteworthy, however, that both the majority opinion and 
O'Connor's concurrence purported to apply the same rational basis 
test that was set forth in Romer. The opinions simply ditlered on the 
constitutional vessel by which the test arrived; the majority f:wored a 
due process analysis while the concurrence f:wored equal 
protection. 54 But as Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent55-and as 
47. 539 U.S 551l (2003 ). 
48. Id. at 578. 
49. 478 U.S. 186,196 (1986). 
50. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
51. !d. at 566 ("One difference between the two cases is that the Ccorgia suture 
prohibited the conduct whether or not the participants were of the same-sex, while the Texas 
statute, as we have seen, applies only to participants of the s.1me sex."). 
52. !d. at 574. 
53. Id. at 579 (O'Connor,)., concurring). 
54. Id. ("Rather than relying on the substantive component of the rourteenth 
Amendment's Due Process Clause, as the Court docs here, I b.1se my conclusion on the 
rourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause."). 
55. Id. at 601 (Scalia,)., dissenting). 
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Justice O'Connor acknowledged in her concurrence56-the rational 
basis test applied in Lawrence was quite different from the Court's 
traditional approach. At least where the issue of homosexuality is 
involved, a majority of the Justices are willing to declare some 
perceptions to be irrational, even if a considerable majority of the 
populace shared those perceptions. 57 Taken together, Romer and 
Lawrence suggest that state efforts to enforce, by way of punishment 
or disadvantage to persons or discrete groups, conventional sexual 
morality between adults are irrational and therefore unconstitutional. 
V. THE IMMINENT CONFLICT BETWEEN ROMER AND STATE 
DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACTS 
The foregoing readings of Romer and Lawrence demonstrate the 
tension between Supreme Court jurisprudence and state defense of 
marriage acts. To further illustrate the inevitable conflict, consider 
the two hypothetical cases involving Pat and Jordan. 58 In the first 
case, Jordan attempted to completely disinherit Pat, and Pat claimed 
the Nebraska forced share. In this scenario, Pat seems unlikely to win 
unless the Supreme Court adopts the most expansive reading of 
Romer. Although it is an admittedly blurry line between benefit and 
punishment, in this case, Nebraska is simply denying one of the 
unique benefits of marriage to Pat. If Nebraska violates equal 
protection by denying a unique benefit of marriage to a couple that 
Nebraska does not wish to treat as married, then it follows that 
Nebraska must allow them to be married. Of course, it may be that 
the law will eventually take this turn, but to do so would require the 
most far-reaching reading of Romer. 
The second case, in which Pat claims the intestate share, is much 
closer. In this case at least, Pat and Jordan are arguably being singled 
out for worse treatment because they are homosexual. In this second 
case, neither Pat nor Jordan seek a truly unique benefit of marriage. 
Nebraska has no real animosity to Pat inheriting from Jordan 
because a will to that effect would certainly be upheld absent undue 
56. I d. at 580 (O'Connor, J ., concurring) ("When a law exhibits such a desire to harm a 
politically unpopular group, we have applied a more searching f(xm of rational basis review to 
strike down such bws under the Equal Protection Clause."). 
57. See id. at 585 (finding that a state's moral disapproval is not sutlicicnt to outlaw 
sodomy). 
58. Sec supra Part Ill. 
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intluence. 59 Moreover, no other group is subjected to a similar 
disability. It seems very likely that a marriage violating Nebraska's 
age or consanguinity laws, but valid when and where celebrated, 
would be treated as sufficient to allow Pat to take the intestate 
share.60 Under the "intermediate" reading of Romer, Pat has--to 
borrow the Supreme Court's term from Lawrencrr-a "tenable" 
equal protection argument. 
It is at the intersection of cases like this second hypothetical that 
Romer and state defense of marriage acts will likely first collide. The 
yet-to-be-answered question is which law will walk away from the 
collision: state defense of marriage acts or Romer1 Based on the 
gradual evolution of substantive constitutional rights f(Jr 
homosexuals, it might seem that it will be Romer that survives 
unscathed. As recently as 1986, the Supreme Court emphatically 
denied a constitutional challenge to sodomy laws.n1 But by the early 
and mid -1990's, equal protection challenges to statutes limiting 
marriage to opposite-sex couples were gaining traction in state 
courts. 62 The next decade brought the first unambiguous victory for 
proponents of same-sex marriage when Massachusetts's high court 
struck down the opposite-sex limitation on its marriage statute. 63 By 
this time, the Supreme Court had reversed course on the 
constitutionality of sodomy laws in Lawrence. Judicial momentum is 
clearly on the side of Romer. 
Part of this judicial momentum, however, has come from sliding 
down a slippery slope.64 The fear of undesirable effects on 
heterosexuals has created the slippery nature of that slope. The 
Lawrence majority, for instance, worried aloud about the possibility 
that the Texas legislature might redraft the statute to cover 
heterosexual conduct if the Court rested its decision on equal 
protection grounds.65 
S9. See, eg., In reAnonymous, 347 N.Y.S.2d 263,264 (Sur. Ct. 1973). 
60. See, eg., In re May's Estate, 114 N.E.2d 4, 7 (N.Y. 1953) (holding that, l(>r 
purposes of determining the distribution of an estate, a valid marriage between an uncle and a 
niece of half blood was legal where celebrated but incestuous in their state of residence). 
61. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 ( 1986). 
62. See supra note 3. 
63. See Goodrich v. Dcp't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968-70 (Mass. 2003 ). 
64. Borchers, supra note 2, at 269. 
65. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. S58, S75 (2003) ("Were we to hold the statute invalid 
under the Equal Protection Clause some might question whether a prohibition would be valid 
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But the slipperiness that has helped to give the same-sex 
marriage movement judicial momentum may suddenly become its 
enemy. Homosexuality is, of course, one of many minority sexual 
practices. Two others are polygamy and adult incest. While not as 
common as homosexuality,66 neither is unheard of~67 and each is 
more unpopular than homosexuality. 68 It is here that Romer may 
skid as it approaches the intersection. One of the rationales of the 
if drawn differently, say, to prohibit the conduct both between same-sex and ditTcrcnt-sex 
participants."). 
66. The question of what percentage of adults is homosexual is a notoriously 
controversial matter. A good summary of the available data is contained in Lynn Wardle, A 
Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 89 
n.402. Although the percentage of adults who have had at least one same-gender partner may 
be in the high single digits, slightly fewer than three percent of men and two percent of 
women identifY themselves as homosexual or bisexual. !d. 
67. Although less common than same-sex unions, such unions are not rare. See, eg., 
Aida Edcnnriam & Kate Conolly, Blood Ties, GVAimiAN (London), feb. 28, 2007, at 12 
(detailing relationship between German brother and sister that resulted in the birth of four 
children; discussing their efliJrtS to challenge the provision in the German civil code 
criminalizing their sexual relationship; and noting that Sweden apparently allows marriages 
between half-siblings). Sexual attraction between adult siblings is apparently common if the 
siblings were raised apart. See Nigel Hawkes, Taboo of Incest Explained by RelatiJ>e Boredom, 
TIMES (London), Apr. 3, 1995, at l. In some states, polygamous unions arc estimated to 
account !(Jr as much as two percent of the population. See Julie Cart, Utah Paying a Hi._qh Price 
for l'olY._qamy, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2001, at Al. The possibility for a constitutional challenge to 
laws prohibiting polygamous marriages is more than theoretical. In State 1'. Holm, the Utah 
Supreme Court, in a split decision, upheld against a Lawrertce challenge a bigamy prosecution 
of a man who, after lawfully marrying his first wile, entered into a marriage-like ceremony with 
another woman and then later the sixteen-year-old sister of his first wife. 137 P.3d 726 (Utah 
2006). 
68. A recent poll showed that Calit(>rnians arc "almost evenly split" on whether to allow 
same-sex marriage. See ]esse Hamlin, Ad Bach Right to Wed the One You Wartt, S.F. CHR0:-1., 
Oct. 9, 2007, at Al. Nationally, support for same-sex marriage is lower than it is in California, 
with tifty-scven percent opposing it in a recent poll. See CNN.com, Democratic Hopefuls 
Pressed on Gay Issues at forum, http:/ jwww.cnn.com/2007 /POLITICS/08/10/ 
gay.t(Jrum/index.html. E\-en though, however, a majority of adults oppose same-sex marriage, 
a sizeable traction is supportive or at least not in opposition. Id. Reliable polling data on 
polygamous or incestuous unions is hard to lind because neither has any mainstream political 
support. Only six percent of respondents to a 2005 poll thought that polygamy (actually 
technically "polygvny" because the question was apparently addressed to the one man, several 
women varictv of polygamy) was morally acceptable. See Eugene Volokh, Same-Sex Marriages 
and Slippe1:v Slopn, 33 HOfSTRA L. REV. 1155, 1164 n.27 (2005). Indirect evidence of the 
lack of support t(Jr incestuous unions can be seen !rom the absence of any outcry trom 
prosecutions and harsh sentences t(>r adult incest. See JctT Jacoby, Hypocrisy on Adult Consent, 
BosTo~ l;I.oBE, Aug. 28, 2005, at C.ll (discussing case of brother and sister raised apart 
who met and bore f(mr children and in which participants were sentenced to eight- and tive-
vear terms respectively in maximum security f.J.Cilities ). The brother's petition for habeas corpus 
was denied by Mut!J JJ. fruuk, 412 f.3d 808 (7th Cir.), cert. dmied, 546 U.S. 988 (2005). 
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Romer majority opinion is the political unpopularity of homosexuals 
and Amendment 2 's "peculiar property of imposing a broad and 
undifferentiated disability on a single named group."69 But as Justice 
Scalia pointed out in his dissent/0 this logic would apply with even 
more force to polygamists. Justice Scalia cited the Supreme Court's 
1890 opinion in Davis v. Beason/ 1 which upheld an Idaho territorial 
statute barring polygamists from holding public office.72 The 
majority's efforts at distinguishing Davis were (to be charitable) 
unconvincing given that the disability imposed on polygamists by the 
Idaho statute were more severe than those imposed on homosexuals 
by Colorado's Amendment 2.73 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Thus, if the Court proceeds down the road it is now traveling, it 
will eventually face a choice: the Court must either extend Romer to 
other sexual minority groups or decide that homosexuals are entitled 
to special protection not available to other sexual minority groups. 
Either choice is fraught with peril. Advocates of same-sex marriage 
have, with good reason, resisted vigorously the comparison to 
polygamy and incest, realizing that many who are willing to accept 
same-sex unions would vigorously oppose polygamous or incestuous 
unions. 74 To state instead that homosexuals are entitled to special 
protection is probably more palatable but would almost certainly 
open the door wide to a federal constitutional right to same-sex 
marriage. 75 Even if a majority of the Court is willing to take this step 
(which is far from clear), that development might well breathe life 
69. Romerv. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,632 (1996). 
70. Id. at 649 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890)). 
71. 133 U.S. 333 (1890). 
72. Id. at 348. 
73. Romer, 517 U.S. at 649 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that Polygamists were denied 
the power to vote and consequently could not seek to amend the state constitution forbidding 
polygamy). 
74. The slippery slope arguments and the political dynamics are discussed extensively in 
Volokh, supra note 68. For an extensive discussion of the possible extension of the sexual 
liberty arguments to incest, see Brett H. McDonnell, Is Incest Next?, 10 CARDOZO WOME:-I'S 
L.J. 337, 359 (2004) (concluding that extension likely to be limited to step-relatives and 
cousins but describing as "unseemly" the efforts of proponents of same-sex marriage to deny 
the analogy between homosexual conduct and incest). 
75. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 601 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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into ·what have been mostly dormant efforts to amend the United 
States Constitution to outlaw same-sex marriages. 76 
( )n the other hand, the Court may hit the brakes and decide not 
to travel any further down the Romer road. The Court could achieve 
this halt by taking the most limited view of Romer, which would 
confine it to circumstances in which a group is excluded from the 
political process. On that view, Romer would impact neither 
hypothetical case involving Pat and Jordan and the collision would 
be avoided, at least f(x now. 
Regardless, the issue will not disappear. Same-sex unions arc 
likely to remain in place in at least a few states, and a large number of 
states have and will likely continue to have state defense of marriage 
acts. That reality, coupled with the Supreme Court's slippery opinion 
in Romer, together seem likely to lead to a collision between those 
state laws and equal protection principles. 
76. Borchers, supra note 2, at 266 (discussing political support for constitutional 
amendment). 
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